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TWO MORE STRIKES AGAINST VAGUE VAGRANCY ORDINANCES:
PALMER v. EUCLID AND COATES v. CINCINNATI
In two recent decisions the United States Supreme Court reversed the
convictions of defendants charged with violation of two vagrancy-type
ordinances.1 Although not landmark decisions, these two cases lend sup-
port to the increasing belief that laws invalidating essentially non-detri-
mental behavior are in conflict with the tenets of a democratic society. This
note will discuss the ramifications of these and other decisions concerning
the interrelationship of the investigative powers of the police vis a vis the
personal liberties of the individual in the area of vagrancy legislation.2
The first part of this note will concentrate on the development of Ohio
vagrancy law throughout the last century, and the impact of Palmer v.
Euclid and Coates v. Cincinnati on this development. As was often the
case in other areas of the law, the early Ohio decisions refused to disturb
the actions of the legislature and upheld vagrancy laws on the basis of
sovereign police power. But as the due process clause of the fourteenth
amendment began to emerge as a more effective constitutional protection of
of individuals, the courts began to revise their approach to vagrancy laws.
Palmer and Coates join a long line of decisions adopting a later approach,
and represent the present position of American vagrancy law.
The remainder of the note will consider the constitutional objections to
vagrancy legislation. One of the Supreme Court's chief objections to the
suspicious person ordinance of Euclid, Ohio, in Palmer and the loitering
ordinance of Cincinnati, Ohio, in Coates was that both ordinances were
unconstitutionally vague in that they failed to give men of ordinary intelli-
gence fair notice of what constitutes unlawful conduct. However, even if
vagrancy ordinances satisfy this "fair notice" requirement, many other con-
stitutional guarantees must be safeguarded. For example, the laws must be
written with sufficient specificity to avoid granting the police unfettered
administrative discretion, and prevent the infringement of constitutionally
permissible conduct as well. The desired result is a law which recognizes
these constitutional limitations while not unduly restricting the investiga-
tive powers of the police.
I. PALMER V. EUCLID3
A. The Palmer Facts and Opinion
While patrolling the parking lot of an apartment complex in Euclid,
1 Palmer v. Euclid, 402 U.S. 544 (1971); Coates v. Cindnnati, 402 U.S. 611 (1971). For
purposes of this paper, terms such as "vagrancy ordinance' and "vagrancy legislation" will be
limited solely to loitering and suspicious person laws.2 At the outset, the author expresses his thanks to Messrs. Niki Z. Schwartz and Joshua J.
Kancelbauxn, attorneys for Mr. Palmer, and Mr. Robert R. Lavercombe, attorney for Mr. Coates,
who, through their Supreme Court briefs, provided information helpful in the research of this
note.
3 402 U.S. 544 (1971).
NOTES
Ohio, a policeman noticed Palmer's automobile proceeding at a slow rate
of speed without headlights in the driveway of the parking lot. The po-
liceman observed a "colored female" alight from the car and enter one of
the apartment buildings. The patrolman's suspicion was aroused at this
point since, as he alleged, he "knew" that no "colored females" resided at
the building. Defendant Palmer then turned on his headlights before
pulling his car onto the street to park. The patrolman followed Palmer,
discovered him speaking over a two-way radio and thereupon requested
that Palmer alight from his automobile and present his identification. Up-
on further investigation the patrolman failed to find any weapons. A
thorough search of the apartment building also failed to locate the female,
whose whereabouts Palmer claimed not to know. The patrolman then
arrested Palmer and took him to the police station for further questioning,
during which time Palmer gave three different addresses for himself and no
satisfactory explanation of his purpose in going to the apartments beyond
that of dropping off his friend.
Palmer was charged with violation of the suspicious person ordinance
of Euclid, Ohio, which states in pertinent part:
It shall be unlawful for any suspicious person to be within the Munic-
ipality. The following shall be deemed suspicious persons:
(e) Any person who wanders about the streets or other public ways or who
is found abroad at late or unusual hours in the night without any visible or
lawful business and who does not give satisfactory account of himself;4
At trial, Palmer's cross-examination5 of the arresting officer resulted in
the disclosure that there was no evidence of any substantive crime com-
mitted by either Palmer or his female friend and, in fact, no crime at all had
been reported for that evening at or near the apartment complex. How-
ever, the jury found Palmer guilty of being a suspicious person, and the
court sentenced him to 30 days in jail and fined him $50.
After Palmer's appeals to the Court of Appeals for Cuyahoga County
and the Supreme Court of Ohio, the United States Supreme Court noted
probable jurisdiction6 and heard the case. In a brief opinion the Supreme
Court reversed Palmer's conviction, and held: . . . "[T]he ordinance is
so vague and lacking in ascertainable standards of guilt that, as applied
to Palmer, it failed to give 'a person of ordinary intelligence fair notice
that his contemplated conduct is forbidden.' "'7 In a joint concurring
opinion, Justices Stewart and Douglas stated that the Court should have
4 EUCLID, OHIO, ORDiNANcB § 583.01 (1960).
5Although not an attorney, Palmer conducted his own defense at the trial.
6 397 U.S. 1073 (1970).
7 402 U.S. 544, 545 (1971) (emphasis added), citing United States v. Harriss, 347 U.S. 612,
617 (1954).
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held the ordinance unconstitutionally vague on its face." By adopting
the narrower holding that the ordinance was merely unconstitutional as
applied to the defendant, the majority refused to consider the broader
issue -- whether suspiciousness per se may be designated as a crime.
B. Ohio Decisions Concerning the Validity of Suspicious Person
Ordinances - From Morgan to Thompson
Prior to the 1960's the Ohio courts had little compunction in upholding
convictions based on vagrancy laws. But as courts throughout the country
began to focus to a greater extent on the rights of the accused, Ohio joined
in the trend and adopted a more liberal approach toward such legislation.
This transition was not unanimously approved by all Ohio courts; some
even had difficulty reaching consistent decisions from one case to the next.
The earliest Ohio case on the topic of municipal vagrancy ordinances is
Morgan v. Nolte.' Although the ordinance in Morgan was not specifically
termed a "suspicious person" ordinance, the subject matter of the ordinance
encompassed the inherently suspicious class designated as "known thieves."
The basic question presented in Morgan was whether the city council of
Cincinnati was authorized to create the offense of which the defendant was
convicted. The city council in enacting the statute had relied on § 2108 of
the Ohio Revised Statutes.10 The court had first to decide whether the
enactment of the statute was within the power conferred upon the general
assembly. Deciding against the accused on both questions, the court held:
The only limitations to the creation of offenses by the legislative power,
are the guarantees contained in the bill of rights, neither of which is in-
fringed by the statute in question. It is a mistake to suppose that offenses
must be confined to specific acts of commission or omission. A general
course of conduct or mode of life which is prejudicial to the public wel-
fare may likewise be prohibited and punished as an offense."
In 1962 the Ohio Supreme Court began to alter its view toward suspi-
cious person laws. In Columbus v. DeLong' 2 the court held that an
8402 U.S. 544, 546 (1971).
9 37 Ohio St. 23 (1881).
10 An all-inclusive statute, OrIo REv. STAT. § 2108 (1880), provided that the cities shall
have the power:
[TMo provide for the punishment of any vagrant, common street beggar, common
prostitute, habitual disturber of the peace, known pickpocket, gambler, burglar, thief,
watchstuffer, ballgame player, a person who practices any trick, game, or device with
intent to swindle, a person who abuses his family, and any suspicious person who can-
not give a reasonable account of himself. Id. at 24.
"137 Ohio St. 23, 25 (1881). The Ohio courts have considered similar vagrancy ordinances
in Welch v. Cleveland, 97 Ohio St. 311, 120 N.E. 206 (1917), In re Opal Howard, 15 Ohio
•C.C.R. (n.s.) 171 (1912), and Bader v. McCartin, 6 Ohio App. 76 (1915). These cases were
also disposed of on the question of improper delegation of power, and a discussion of them adds
little to the analysis presented here.
12 173 Ohio St. 81, 180 N.E.2d 158 (1962).
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ordinance making it a criminal offense for a prostitute merely to wander
the streets was an unauthorized exercise of the city's police power. The
court based its decision on two grounds: (1) the ordinance was too inde-
finite; and, (2) the ordinance was too restrictive. "After all, a prostitute,
no matter how reprehensible her mode of life, is a human being with rights
protected by the Constitution, and by merely wandering, without more,
she commits no criminal offense."' 13
Yet DeLong confuses rather than clarifies the Ohio Supreme Court's
disposition toward vagrancy ordinances. The court recognized that its de-
cision conflicted with Morgan and Welch, but it attempted to distinguish
these cases on the ground that "the terminology of the ordinance" in De-
Long was different. But the court did not explain the way in which it was
different.14  Ohio courts, therefore, are left with no clear guidelines on
which to base a determination of what terminology constitutes lawful as
opposed to unlawful exercise of police power.
The first significant attack on suspicious person ordinances occurred in
1967 in the Cleveland Municipal Court case of Cleveland v. Forrest.'5 In
previous cases (Morgan, Welch, and Howard) the defendants assailed
such ordinances on the ground that they were an unlawful exercise of dele-
gated power. Forrest was the first case which focused on basic constitu-
tional principles. The court invalidated the ordinance on fourth and fifth
amendment grounds. On the fourth amendment ground the court an-
nounced that the investigative powers of the police must be balanced with
"the necessity that citizens be secure in their persons against seizure without
probable cause. '16 The court indicated that the ordinance in question
unfairly favored the police by allowing them to make searches without
probable cause. On the fifth amendment ground the court stated:
It cannot now be doubted that the police power of a municipality does not
extend to permit the compulsory interrogation of persons. Indeed, the Su-
preme Court of the United States has through a series of decisions defined
procedures which must be followed in the pursuit of this police power....
To require a citizen to reasonably and satisfactorily account for his pres-
ence upon the public streets offends the right to silence guaranteed by the
Fifth Amendment.' 7
Forrest was a municipal court case, and of course not binding on the
Supreme Court of Ohio, but in line with Forrest the supreme court was
soon to take a more negative view of suspicious person ordinances. Four
years after Forrest and five months prior to the United States Supreme
Court's decision in Palmer, the Ohio Supreme Court, in Columbus v.
13M. at 83, 180 N.E.2d at 160.
14 Id.
Ia39 Ohio Op. 2d 203, 223 N.E.2d 661 (Cleveland Mun. Ct. 1967).
16 Id. at 206, 223 N.X.2d at 665.
1 Id. at 205, 223 N.E.2d at 664.
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Thompson,' 8 considered a challenge to a suspicious person ordinance identi-
cal to the Euclid ordinance in Palmer. Although the appellant attacked
the ordinance on the same grounds asserted in Forrest, the Thompson court
adopted a wholly different rationale. The court did not discuss the fourth
amendment right against unreasonable searches and seizures, or the fifth
amendment privilege against self-incrimination, but rested its decision
solely on the fourteenth amendment due process clause. The court may
have foreseen that its decision in Palmer might be overturned by the United
States Supreme Court, for it adopted the same rationale in Thompson as
the Supreme Court later employed in Palmer.
We conclude, and so hold, that this portion of the ordinance lacks "ascer-
tainable standards of guilt" and is so vague and indefinite that "men of
common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to
its application."19
Thus two 1971 cases have struck down convictions based on suspicious
person ordinances: The highest court in the land held one unconstitutional
'as applied; the highest court of the state of Ohio held the other unconstitu-
tional on its face. Certainly the judicial future of suspicious person ordi-
nances is gloomy.
II. COATES V. CINCINNATI - THE LOITiUMNG ORDINANCE
A. The Coates Facts and Opinion
Neither the record of Coates v. Cincinnat?°' nor the briefs of the
appellants and appellee reveal much of the factual situation of this case."'
Basically, the defendants-appellants were a student (Coates) involved in
a demonstration and pickets involved in a labor dispute. All the defen-
dants were arrested under the loitering ordinance of Cincinnati, Ohio,
which provides:
It shall be unlawful for three or more persons to assemble, except at a pub-
lic meeting of citizens, on any of the sidewalks, street corners, vacant lots,
or mouths of alleys, and there conduct themselves in a manner annoying
to persons passing by, or occupants of adjacent buildings.22
All defendants were found guilty and their convictions were affirmed
by the Ohio Supreme Court.'s The United States Supreme Court noted
probable jurisdiction24 and heard the case.
18 25 Ohio St. 2d 26, 266 N.E.2d 571 (1971).
3RId. at 33, 266 N.E.2d at 575.
20 402 U.S. 611 (1971).
21 Because appellants' only position was that the ordinance on its face violated the first and
fourteenth amendments, a lengthy discussion of the facts is unnecessary.
22 CINCnNATI, OssO, CODE § 901-L6 (1956).
23 21 Ohio St. 2d 66,255 N.E.2d 247 (1970).
24 398 U.S. 902 (1970).
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The United States Supreme Court determined that, as the ordinance in
Palmer, the ordinance in Coates was unconstitutionally vague in that it
specified no standard of prohibited conduct. The Court held the ordinance
unconstitutional on its face, and discussed three other constitutional in-
firmities of the ordinance to support its decision: (1) the ordinance con-
ferred unfettered discretion to police officers, thus inviting discriminatory
enforcement; (2) it made criminal actions which could not constitutionally
be connoted a crime; and, (3) it violated the constitutional right of free
assembly and association. Thus Coates has far greater precedential value
than does Palmer, and it will presumably cause numerous repeals of loiter-
ing ordinances now in effect.
B. Ohio Decisions Concerning Loitering Ordinances
In reversing the convictions in Coates the United States Supreme Court
rejected the rationale of the Supreme Court of Ohio, which had interpreted
the ordinance according to its apparent meaning without applying any
narrowing construction. 25 The Ohio court had written a very terse opinion
in which it failed to cite any Ohio cases supporting its decision. There may
be a good reason for this approach, for Ohio case law has almost universally
struck down such ordinances.
Ten years prior to the Ohio Supreme Court's decision in Coates three
lower Ohio courts had determined that ordinances strikingly similar to the
one in Coates were unconstitutional on their face. In Toledo v. Sims, "
the Municipal Court of Toledo declared a loitering ordinance of Toledo
unconstitutional on the grounds that it impaired the defendants' right of
assembly and that it granted the police absolute discretion in determining
whom to arrest. Although the Ohio Supreme Court in Coates had observed
that the word "annoy" presented no constitutional problem, the Sims court
expressed a different viewpoint:
Neither the Constitution of the United States nor the Constitution of Ohio
limit the rights of any of its inhabitants to congregate or assemble upon
conditions of person, place or purpose, or subject to annoyance or complaint
of others who have granted and are subject to the same constitutional rights
and duties, whether they be neighbors or public officials, organized or un-
organized.27
The Sims court relied to a considerable extent on the then four month
old case of Cleveland v. Baker.28 The Baker majority struck down a typical
2 The Ohio Supreme Court concluded that the ordinance: "clearly and precisely delineates
its reach in words of common understanding. It is a 'precise and narrowly drawn regulatory
statute [ordinance] evincing a legislative judgment that certain specific conduct be ... pro-
scribed."' 21 Ohio St. 2d at 69, 255 N.E.2d at 249.
26 14 Ohio Op. 2d 66, 169 N.E.2d 516 (Toledo Mun. Ct. 1960).
27 Id. at 68, 169 N.E.2d at 518 (emphasis added).
28 83 Ohio L. Abs. 502, 167 N.E.2d 119 (Ct App. 1960).
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loitering ordinance adopting the rationale employed in Sims, and added:
"An ordinance which forbids an act in terms so vague that men of com-
mon intelligence and understanding must guess as to its meaning and differ
as to its application violates the first essential of due process of law."'
Although this decision of the Court of Appeals for Cuyahoga County
(adopting the identical rationale later employed by the United States Su-
preme Court in Coates) had been decided 10 years prior to the Supreme
Court of Ohio's decision in Coates, the Ohio Supreme Court completely
ignored it in upholding a very similar ordinance.
In Akron v. Effland,30 the third 1960 case regarding loitering ordi-
nances, the Court of Appeals of Summit County held an ordinance uncon-
stitutional on the ground that it was an arbitrary and unreasonable exercise
of the city's right to enact local legislation. The court found the ordinance
unreasonable on the ground that there was no saving or justification clause
which would apply to individuals justifiably tarrying on the public streets.
Accordingly, one who is merely window shopping or waiting for an
acquaintance could be convicted for violation of the ordinance. Clearly
such a conviction would be unconstitutional3 l
Though these Ohio and Supreme Court decisions indicate a current
wave of disfavor toward vagrancy laws, it appears that the issue is not yet
fully settled. For example, the fact that the Ohio Supreme Court retreated
from DeLong in Coates, and then within one year returned to its former
viewpoint in Thompson indicates the difficulties of the court in formulating
a fixed rule in this area of the law. Even more arcane is the seemingly in-
consistent action of the United States Supreme Court in holding Coates
unconstitutional on its face while deciding that Palmer was merely uncon-
stitutional as applied, even though the two cases were decided within
weeks of each other and the same legal principles were applicable to both.
Whether or not this approach indicates the courts' lack of certainty in the
invalidity of vagrancy laws awaits further judicial clarification, and is
beyond the scope of this note. However, because of the prevailing national
concern for increased law and order, and the apparent relative conservatism
of the present Supreme Court, it is possible that Coates and Palmer will
not go unchallenged in future litigation. Because of these factors, the
objections to vagrancy laws must be crystallized into dear and precise rules
29 Id. at 504, 167 N.E.2d at 121.
30 15 Ohio Op. 2d 341, 174 N.E.2d 285 (Ct. App. 1960).
31 See, e.g., Cleveland v. Anderson, 13 Ohio App. 2d 83, 234 N.E.2d 304 (1968), in which
the court reversed a conviction based on violation of a loitering ordinance on the ground that it
failed to give fair notice of what conduct it proscribed. Interestingly, the Anderson opinion was
written by Judge Corrigan, who two years later reached an opposite conclusion in writing the
majority opinion for the Ohio Supreme Court in Cincinnati v. Coates, 21 Ohio St. 2d 66, 255
N..2d 247 (1970). Again in 1971, he altered his view in striking down a suspicious person
ordinance in Columbus v. Thompson, 25 Ohio St. 2d 26, 266 N.E.2d 571 (1971).
[Vol. 32
NOTES
of constitutional law in order to withstand the pressures of those advocating
further promulgation and enforcement of vagrancy legislation.
III. CONSTITUTIONAL OBJECTIONS TO VAGRANCY ORDINANCES
The remainder of this note will discuss objections to vagrancy ordi-
nances, some of which were adopted by the Court in Palmer and Coates.
As will become apparent, some of these objections apply more readily to
suspicious person ordinances, such as the self-incrimination argument, and
some are more closely connected to loitering ordinances, such as the free-
dom of movement and right of assembly arguments. However, all of these
objections originate from the vagueness doctrine, which has historically
been recognized by courts and commentators as the chief infirmity of such
ordinances .32
Generally, the vagueness doctrine is founded upon three distinct yet
similar policies: (1) an ordinance may be vague in that it fails to give fair
notice of what conduct is prohibited; 3 (2) it may be vague in that law
enforcement officers are given unbridled discretion in administering it;84
and, (3) the vagueness may invite infringement of constitutionally protec-
ted rights.3,
A. Fair Notice
The "fair notice" aspect of the vagueness doctrine was the sole ground
for reversal in Palmer.
Palmer could reasonably be charged with knowing that he was on the streets
at a late or unusual hour and that denying knowledge of his friend's iden-
tity and claiming multiple addresses amounted to an unsatisfactory explana-
tion under the ordinance. But in our view the ordinance gave insufficient
notice to the average person that discharging a friend at an apartment
house and then talking on a car telephone while parked on the street was
enough to show him to be "without visible or lawful business."36
In Coates the Court held:
The ordinance is vague not in the sense that it requires a person to con-
form his conduct to an imprecise but comprehensible normative standard,
but rather in the sense that no standard of conduct is specified at all.37
M Giaccio v. Pennsylvania, 382 U.S. 399 (1966); Lanzetta v. New Jersey, 306 U.S. 451
(1939); Connally v. General Constr. Co., 269 U.S. 385 (1926); Amsterdam, Federal Constitu-
tional Restrictions on the Punishment of Crimes of Status, Crimes of General Obnoxiousness,
Crimes of Displeasing Police Officers, and the Like, 3 CaIM. L BULL. 205 (1967); Note, The
Void-for-Vagueness Doctrine in the Supreme Court, 109 U. PA. L. REv. 67 (1960).
33 Lanzetta v. New Jersey, 306 U.S. 451 (1939).
34 Giaccio v. Pennsylvania, 382 U.S. 399 (1966).
35 NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415 (1962).
36 402 U.S. 544, 545-46 (1971).
37 402 U.S. 611, 614 (1971).
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The best approach in reviewing the "fair notice" requirement, and how
it may be violated by ordinances such as in Palmer and Coates, is to examine
the particular words of each ordinance and determine the way in which
these words offend the requirement. For example, the Cincinnati ordi-
nance involved in Coates contained the word "annoy." The Supreme Court
commented:
Conduct that annoys some people does not annoy others ... [The city
cannot prohibit antisocial conduct] through the enactment and enforce-
ment of an ordinance whose violation may entirely depend upon whether
or not a policeman is annoyed.88
No standard is established by which an individual may know what con-
duct is annoying, and a determination cannot be made until a complainant
causes an arrest. Neither the police nor a citizen can possibly conduct him-
self in a lawful manner unless an ordinance designed to regulate conduct
contains ascertainable guidelines to govern its enforcement."' An
ordinance lacking these guidelines is violative of the fifth and fourteenth
amendment due process clauses.40
Anyone could become an unwitting violator of such ordinances since
conviction could be authorized simply because a sensitive onlooker of an
assemblage is annoyed by some incidental attribute of one of the partici-
pants, or more likely, by the tone of one's speech. Certainly a conviction
based on a rule prohibiting annoying speech would violate the first amend-
ment. The very purpose of the first amendment is to provoke discussion
and stimulate the dissemination of novel viewpoints, which quite often
creates disturbances.41 If the controversial cannot be spoken, people hear
only one side of every issue and are thereby deprived of the opportunity to
formulate their own ideas.
The ordinance in Palmer contains even more vague terminology. For
instance, the term "wanders" is incomprehensible as a guide for the gover-
nance of conduct. The Ohio Supreme Court has twice invalidated ordi-
nances containing this word for failing to provide fair notice. In Columbus
v. DeLong" it was held that since the term "wandering" - as used in an
ordinance directed at prostitutes - is commonly interpreted to mean "to
38Id.
39 Cleveland v. Anderson, 13 Ohio App. 2d 83, 234 N.E.2d 304 (1968). But see Cleveland
v. Denney, 89 Ohio L. Abs. 312 (Cleveland Mun. Ct. 1962), which upheld the validity of a new
ordinance enacted by the city of Cleveland after the previous ordinance was struck down in
Cleveland v. Baker, 83 Ohio L. Abs. 502, 167 N.E.2d 119 (Ct. App. 1960). Although the
court agreed with the accused that the word "annoyance" as used in the ordinance was in the
form of a conclusion, the court felt that the use of the adjective "serious" modifying "annoy-
ance" sufficiently darified the type of offense, enabling the police to be guided by standards,
rather than by discretion.
4 0 Coates v. Cincinnati, 402 U.S. 611 (1971).
41 Shuttlesworth v. Birmingham, 394 U.S. 147 (1969); Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536(1965); Edwards v. South Carolina, 372 U.S. 229 (1963).
42 173 Ohio St. 81, 180 N.E.2d 158 (1962).
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move about without a fixed course, aim, or goal," 43 the word is not connota-
tive of criminal intent, and the ordinance therefore was an unconsti-
tutional prohibition of innocent conduct. And in Columbus v.
Thompson 4 the court relied on DeLong in holding that the term "wander-
ing" was "too indefinite, restrictive, and liberty-depriving to satisfy due pro-
cess requirements." 45
Obviously the legislatures do not intend to prohibit innocent conduct
by means of these ordinances, but vaguely worded ordinances could easily
encompass such activities as window shopping, sitting in a park, or merely
taking a walk." "The ordinance(s) make no distinction between conduct
calculated to harm and that which is essentially innocent."47
In Thompson48 the appellee (City of Columbus) argued that although
"wandering" may be too indefinite, when it is considered with the qualify-
ing language of the ordinance indicating that the only individual who will
be arrested for wandering is one "who is found abroad at late or unusual
hours in the night without any visible or lawful business and who does not
give (a) satisfactory account of himself," 49 then the ordinance satisfies due
process requirements. The court rejected this argument by citing the Mas-
sachusetts case of Alegata v. Commonwealth,"0 in which it was noted:
Being abroad in the nighttime no more imports sinister conduct than does
the act of sauntering and loitering proscribed by the ordinance held to be
invalid in Commonwealth v. Carpenter, 325 Mass. 519. Yet the statute
literally applies to all persons, however innocent their conduct may be, who
are abroad at night, arouse the suspicion of a police officer, and, subse-
quently, fail to give a satisfactory account. It is hard to see how suspi-
don of unlawful design or failure to give a satisfactory account, without
more, can transform otherwise innocent behavior into a crime. Suspicion,
which is an inadequate ground for arrest, is no more satisfactory as a basis
for punishment.51
Numerous courts have struck down vagrancy ordinances on the basis
of the many unanswered questions which they contain. For instance: "Is
it constitutional to place the burden on the accused of justifying his pre-
sence by means of the requirement of a satisfactory explanation ?"52 Fur-
43 Id. at 83, 180 N.E.2d at 161.
4425 Ohio St. 2d 26, 266 N.E.2d 571 (1971).
451d. at 31, 266 NE.2d at 574.
46 State v. Caez, 81 N.J. Super. 315, 195 A.2d 496 (1963); Akron v. Effland, 112 Ohio App.
15, 174 N.E.2d 285 (1960); Soles v. Vidalia, 92 Ga. App. 839, 90 S.E.2d 249 (1955); Reich,
Police Questioning of Law Abiding Citizens, 75 YALE L.J. 1161 (1966); Douglas, Vagrancy and
Arrest on Suspicion, 70 YALE L.J. 1, 4 (1960).
4 7 Seattle v. Drew, 70 Wash. 2d 405, 410, 423 P.2d 522, 525 (1967).
4825 Ohio St 2d 26, 266 N.E.2d 571 (1971).
49Id. at 31, 266 N.E.2d at 574.
50 353 Mass. 287, 231 N.E.2d 201 (1967).
51Id. at 292, 231 N.E.2d at 204.
5 2 See, e.g., Cleveland v. Forrest, 39 Ohio Op. 2d 203, 205, 223 N.E.2d 661, 664 (Cleveland
Mun. Cr. 1967).
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thermore, since the word "satisfactory" is not susceptible of any standard of
exactness, will an extremely dubious but truthful account be sufficient? A
credible but false account? When may an account be demanded, and how
much of an explanation is needed to suffice as an account ? Must a satis-
factory account encompass both past and present activity? That is, how
far back in time must the accused justify his conduct? If the account
includes past activity, is this guilt without proof ?" Also, must the account
be morally or legally satisfactory?" Must the account put the accused
above suspicion or must it merely give the officer sufficient credible infor-
mation so as to negate probable cause?56 And what independent investiga-
tion, if any, must the arresting officer make before relying on hearsay?"
Finally, assuming the accused refuses to give any explanation, or is
unable to give one, is he then presumed to be guilty? Courts and commen-
tators believe that such a conclusion would result in a violation of the fifth
amendment right to silence.5 8 Speaking on the principle of presumptive
guilt, the United States Supreme Court has held:
[A] statutory presumption cannot be sustained if there be no rational con-
nection between fact proved and ultimate fact presumed, if the inference
of the one from proof of the other is arbitrary because of lack of connec-
tion between the two in common experience.59
In applying this test to a suspicious person ordinance, another court
reasoned:
The failure to give a good account ... cannot reasonably be equated with
the term "unlawful." Many things may not be "good," but it does not fol-
low that they are necessarily unlawful; moreover, many things may be law-
ful, but they may be less than good.60
B. Administrative Discretion
The vagueness of the law not only creates "fair notice" difficulties, it
also places unduly broad discretion into the hands of law enforcement
officials, thus decreasing the possibility of even-handed justice."' One critic
has commented:
It takes little imagination to perceive that the "reasonable account" (or
5s See, e.g., Scott v. District Attorney, 309 F. Supp. 833, 837 (S.D.N.Y. 1970).
54 See, e.g., Baker v. Bindner, 274 F. Supp. 658 (W.D. Ky. 1967).
55 See, e.g., United States v. Margeson, 259 F. Supp. 256, 268 (E.D. Pa. 1966).
56See, e.g., Ricks v. District of Columbia, 414 F.2d 1097, 1106 (D.C. Cir. 1968).
57 Landry v. Daley, 280 F. Supp. 968, 971 (N.D. Ill. 1968).
58Columbus v. Thompson, 25 Ohio St. 2d 26, 266 N.E.2d 571 (1971); Alegata v. Common-
wealth, 353 Mass. 287, 231 N.E.2d 201 (1967). Contra, People v. Merolla, 9 N.Y.2d 62, 172
N.E.2d 541 (Ct. App. 1961). See also p. 920 infra (discussion on self-incrimination).
59 Totv. United States, 319 U.S. 463,467-68 (1943).
60 United States v. Margeson, 259 F. Supp. 256,269 (E.D. Pa. 1966).
61 Lewis, The Sit-In Cases: Great Expectations, 1963 Sup. CT. REv. 101, 110.
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"good account" or "satisfactory account") requirement of the ordinary vag-
rancy law operates simply as a charter of dictatorial power to the police-
man.62
The Supreme Court has reached this conclusion a number of times. In
the 1965 case of Shuttlesworth v. Birmingham,3 the Supreme Court invali-
dated an ordinance which made it a crime for anyone to loiter after having
been requested by a police officer to disperse. The Court objected to this
arbitrary standard because it "does not provide for government by clearly
defined laws, but rather for government by the moment-to-moment opin-
ions of a policeman on his beat.1'6 4  Accordingly, as an unconstitutional
suppression of first amendment rights, the ordinance bore "the hallmark
of a police state."65
In Cox v. Louisiana"6 the Court recognized that to allow public officials
to determine which expressions will be allowed and which will not "sanc-
tions a device for the suppression of the communication of ideas and per-
mits the official to act as censor. ' 67
This constitutional rule is not limited to cases involving speech or
speech-related matters. It applies to any of the "freedoms which the Con-
stitution guarantees" 68 and has even been extended to include any "right
or privilege."' 9  Outside the first amendment cases, 0 the rule has enjoyed
its widest application where the freedom to choose one's own living was
at issue.7 1
It is uncertain how far the Court will go in striking down vagrancy
ordinances on the ground that they confer undue discretion to police
officers. 'While it may be difficult to enact more specific and narrow ordi-
6 2 Amsterdam, supra note 32, at 223.
63 382 U.S. 87 (1965).
64 Id. at 90, citing separate opinion of Mr. Justice Black in Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536,
579 (1965).
65 ld. at 90-91.
66 379 U.S. 536, 557 (1965).
07 Id. at 557.
68 Staub v. Baxley, 355 U.S. 313, 322 (1958).
6 9 Smith v. Ladner, 288 F. Supp. 66,68 (S.D. Miss. 1968).
7 0 See, e.g., the so-called "permit" cases. The principle of cases such as Cox v. Louisiana, 379
U.S. 536 (1965), Staub v. Baxley, 355 U.S. 313 (1958), Kunz v. New York, 340 U.S. 290
(1951), and Niemotko v. Maryland, 340 U.S. 268 (1951), is as follows: If an ordinance requires
an individual to obtain a permit before he may use public facilities for parading or protesting
purposes, and if the ordinance contains no standards to direct administrators in applying the
ordinance, then if the individual requests a permit and the city officials refuse his request, he may
legally conduct his parade or rally without the permit.
On the other hand, the rule of Poulos v. New Hampshire, 345 U.S. 395 (1953) is that if the
ordinance is valid on its face in that it prescribes an ascertainable standard of conduct for city
officials in administering a permit system, but the individual is denied a permit because of the
arbitrary and discriminatory application of the ordinance by city officials, then the individual is
not free to conduct his meeting without the permit, but must first obtain judicial review of the
unlawful denial of the permit.
71yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886); Hornsby v. Allen, 326 F.2d 605 (5th Cir.
1964); Statev. Allstate Ins. Co., 231 Miss. 869,97 So. 2d 372 (1957).
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nances than presently exist without completely curtailing the investigative
powers of law enforcement officers, 72 Judge Skelly Wright's admonition in
United States v. Matthews73 echoes a caveat not to be lightly brushed
aside:
The discretion that today is widely employed may become the basis of prej-
udice and discrimination tomorrow. Moreover, innumerable studies of
civil disorders in Negro communities have demonstrated that those disord-
ers are in large measure due to the abuse of discretion by law enforcement
offidals. 74
Judge Wright's hesitancy in upholding the validity of discretionary
ordinances is well-founded. F.B.I. statistics reveal that there is a dispropor-
tionate amount of arrests of blacks for vagrancy-type offenses (45.3 per-
cent) compared to total arrests (27.5 percent) .5 Another study has
shown that black youths arrested for minor offenses are given more severe
dispositions after arrest than white youths.7 6  Many other reports have
found that on the whole, law enforcement officials are much more wary of
black suspects than they are of whites.7 7  In fact, the enforcement of the
loitering ordinance in Coates had a prominent effect on the serious civil
disturbance that occurred in Cincinnati in the summer of 1967.78
However, blacks are not the only people discriminated against by such
ordinances. The individual attired in "dirty, ragged dothes", 79 the person
who does not "belong" where he is observed, and the poor, are particularly
susceptible to police interrogation. These phenomena were evident as
early as 1931 when the court in Territory of Hawaii v. Anduhas0 com-
mented: "It [a loitering regulation] may be enforced to suppress one class
of idlers in order to make a place more attractive to other idlers of a more
desirable class." '81
C. Infringement of Constitutionally Protected Conduct
Closely associated with the administrative discretion and "fair notice"
prohibitions is the rule that a vague statute or ordinance construed to punish
72 Sherry, Vagrants, Rogues, and Vagabonds-Old Concepts in Need of Revisiop, 48 CALIF.
L. REv. 557, 571 (1960).
73 419 F.2d 1177 (D.C. Cir. 1969) (dissenting opinion).
74Id. at 1195.
75 F.B.I., UNiFoRM CumB REPoRTs-1968, Table 30, at 120.
76 Piliavin and Briar, Police Encounters with Juveniles, 70 AM. J. OF Soc. 206 (1964).
7 7 See, e.g., P. TIFFANY, D. McINTYRE, and D. RoTENBERG, DETECTION OF ClIMIE (1967);
Kadish, Legal Norms and Discretion in the Police and Sentencing Processes, 75 HARV. L. REV.
904 (1962); LaFave, The Police and Non-enforcement of the Lau-Part I, 1962 Wis. L. REV.
104; Goldstein, Police Discretion Not to Invoke the Criminal Process: Low Visibility Deci.
sions in the Administration of Justice, 69 YALE LJ. 543 (1960).
78 Coates v. Cincinnati, 402 U.S. 611, 616 n. 6 (1971).
7 9 T. GrLsION and J. PODELL, THE PRACTIcAL PATROLMAN (1959).
8048 P.2d 171 (9th Cir. 1931).
811d. at 173.
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constitutionally protected conduct is invalid to the extent that it fails to give
adequate warning of the boundary between constitutionally permissible
and constitutionally impermissible applications. The Supreme Court has
noted that "an ordinance which... makes the peaceful enjoyment of free-
doms which the Constitution guarantees contingent upon the uncontrolled
will of an official . . . is an unconstitutional censorship or prior restraint
upon the enjoyment of those freedoms."8' 2 The remainder of this note will
be devoted to a consideration of these freedoms.
1. Freedom of Assembly
Any legislative attempt to abrogate freedom of assembly is prohibited
by the Constitution even though the legislation is ostensibly motivated by
a desire to insure peace and order in the community. 3  In Coates the
Court held that "mere public intolerance or animosity cannot be the
basis for abridgement ' 84 of the right of free assembly and association.
Although not commented upon by the Court, it could be argued that the
Cincinnati ordinance in Coates also contained two indirect violations of
this Constitutional right. The first is the provision in the ordinance which
approves "annoying" behavior at a "public meeting of citizens" but permits
criminal conviction for "annoying" behavior under all other circum-
stances.8 5 The ordinance does not inform a group of "three or more
persons" as to whether their particular gathering constitutes such a "public
meeting" and excepted from the operation of the ordinance.
In the past the Ohio courts have been seemingly predisposed to invali-
date ordinances forbidding annoying assemblages. Ordinances prescribing
restrictions on Halloween celebrants, 8 socialist sympathizers,87 business-
men,8 8 and barking dogs 9 have all been held invalid. In Sims the court
described how the operation of such ordinances centuries ago would have
curtailed the development of democratic societies.
Under the provisions of Sections 17-5-10 and 17-5-11, arrests and pros-
ecutions, as in the present instance, would have been effective as against
Edmund Pendleton, Peyton Randolph, Richard Henry Lee, George Wythe,
Patrick Henry, Thomas Jefferson, George Washington and others for loiter-
ing and congregating in front of Raleigh Tavern on Duke of Gloucester
82 Staub v. Baxley, 355 U.S. 313, 322 (1958).
83 Edwards v. South Carolina, 372 U.S. 229 (1963); Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88
(1940).
84402 U.S. 611, 615 (1971).
85Id. at 611 n. 1.
8 0 Deer Park v. Schuster, 16 Ohio Op. 485 (C.P. 1940).
87 Cleveland v. Anderson, 13 Ohio App. 2d 83, 234 N.E.2d 304 (1968).
8s Toledo v. Sims, 14 Ohio Op. 2d 66, 169 N.E.2d 516 (Toledo Mun. Ct. 1960).
89 Columbus v. Becher, 173 Ohio St 197, 180 N.E.2d 836 (1962).
1971] NOTES
OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL
Street in Williamsburg, Virginia, at any time during the summer of 1774
to the great annoyance of Governor Dunsmore and his colonial constables.00
The second infirmity in the Cincinnati ordinance is that it allows guilt
by association. This is best demonstrated by the unreported case of Cincin-
nati v. Johnson, a 1968 Ohio case which interpreted the same ordinance
which was later held unconstitutional in Coates. Johnson's arrest and con-
viction arose as the result of civil disturbances in Cincinnati during the
summer of 1967. The evidence showed that a formation of police officers
advanced toward a group of angry people and ordered them to disperse.
The entire crowd moved back, with the exception of Johnson, who re-
mained standing on the sidewalk. The evidence also revealed that John-
son was a professional social worker whose purpose in going to the troubled
area was to assist in preserving order. The Court of Appeals for Hamilton
County reversed Johnson's conviction. Although the court had serious
doubts as to the constitutionality of the ordinance, it deferred any resolu-
tion of that issue and confined its holding to a failure of proof. The court
pointed out that since the evidence did not establish that Johnson had
annoyed anyone (except possibly the arresting officer), the prosecution's
case was built entirely on proof by imputation. The court said that al-
though the mob as a whole conducted themselves in a manner so as to
violate the ordinance, to find Johnson a part of the mob would require the
application of guilt by association - a principle unequivocally rejected by
the court.
2. Freedom of Movement
Although the Coates and Palmer courts, while confronting the validity
of vagrancy ordinances, were silent on the issue of the freedom of move-
ment, other cases imply that such ordinances violate this constitutional
right. Because freedom of movement embodies the same considerations
as freedom of assembly,"' many of the principles regarding freedom of as-
sembly are also applicable to freedom of movement. For instance, the
Court noted in Cox v. Louisiana92 that the government does have the right
to control travel on the streets, but specified that this right is subject to
certain limitations: namely, the restriction must be "designed to promote
the public convenience in the interest of all, and not susceptible to abuses
of discriminatory application.... ." But in illustrating this rule the Court
directed its attention to extreme examples, merely pointing out the obvious:
One may not ignore a red light or other traffic regulations, one may not
90 14 Ohio Op. 2d 66, 69, 169 N.E.2d 516, 520 (Toledo Mun. Ct. 1960).
91 See, e.g., Aptheker v. Secretary of State, 378 U.S. 500, 520 (1964) (Douglas, J., concur-
ring).
92 379 U.S. 536 (1965). See also Hague v. CIO, 307 U.S. 496, 515 (1939).
93 379 U.S. 536, 554 (1965).
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conduct a street meeting in the middle of Times Square at rush hour, and
a group of demonstrators may not cordon off a street or block the entrances
to buildings. 4  The Court failed to cite neutral conduct, such as whether
the government has the right to impede someone's movement merely be-
cause he is loitering or looks suspicious.
Beyond these civil rights cases, there are numerous decisions directly
confronting the freedom of movement. In Kent v. Dulles,95 the right of
a member of the Communist Party to obtain a passport was at issue. Up-
holding this right the Court stated that "[tjhe right to travel is part of
the 'liberty' of which the citizen cannot be deprived without due process of
law under the Fifth Amendment .... Freedom of movement is basic in our
scheme of values."0 6 Quoting extensively from Chafee,9 7 the Court recalled
that "[o]ur nation ... has thrived on the principle that, outside areas of
plainly harmful conduct, every American is left to shape his own life as he
thinks best, to do what he pleases, go where he pleases.""8 Although this
right is not specifically granted by the Constitution, the Court has never
held that the Bill of Rights or fourteenth amendment protect only those
rights that the Constitution explicitly mentions. 9 And in Edward v. Cali-
fornia'00 the concurring opinion of Mr. Justice Douglas revealed that the
right to travel is unquestionably a right of national citizenship guaranteed
by the Constitution.
Therefore, whether this right originates from the privilege and immu-
nities provision of article IV section 2, the commerce clause, or the privi-
lege and immunities clause of the fourteenth amendment, it is a well-settled
principle of constitutional law.' 10 This view was expressed in Aptheker v.
Secretary of Statel'0 -which "rather dearly assimilated 'freedom of move-
ment' into the class of 'preferred' individual liberties entitled to uniquely
stringent judicial protection."' 103 In his concurring opinion, Mr. Justice
Douglas commented that "'freedom of movement,' both internally and
abroad, is 'deeply engrained' in our history . . . a privilege and immunity
of national citizenship.' 0 4
However, like most rights of national citizenship, the right to travel is
941d. at 554-55.
0 357 U.S. 116 (1958).
081d. at 125-26. This privilege also applies to the states through the fourteenth amend-
ment. Williams v. Fears, 179 U.S. 270 (1900).
97 Z. CHAPEE, THRE HumAN RIGHTS IN aHm CONSTITUTION OF 1787 (1956).
08357 U.S. at 126, citing Chafee note 97 supra.
90 See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 486-87 n.1 (1965).
100 314 U.S. 160 (1941).
101 See Steinbach, Constitutional Protection for Freedom of Movement: A Time for Decision,
57 Ky. LJ. 417 (1969); Amsterdam, supra note 40; Vestal, Freedom of Movement, 41 IOWA
L. REv. 6 (1955).
102 378 U.S. 500 (1964).
103 Amsterdam, supra note 32, at 214.
104 378 U.S. 500, 519 (1964).
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not absolute. There are limitations. In Zemel v. Rusk' °5 the Supreme
Court distinguished Kent and held that the Secretary of State could refuse
to issue a passport to a citizen desiring to travel to Cuba. In Kent the issue
was whether a citizen could be denied a passport because of his political
beliefs or associations. In Zemel the issue was whether a citizen could be
denied a passport because of foreign policy considerations affecting all citi-
zens. The restrictions were not directed aganst a particular individual be-
cause of his personal characteristics, but rather applied to all persons in the
form of a geographical limitation. Thus due process of law does not mean
that the right to travel cannot be impeded under certain circumstances. 10
If the necessity for restriction is based on a compelling governmental in-
terest then the right may be inhibited. 07
Vagrancy orinances fall short of satisfying this "compelling govern-
mental interest" test for two reasons: First,
[Eiven though the governmental purpose be legitimate and substantial,
that purpose cannot be pursued by means that broadly strifle fundamental
personal liberties when the end can be more narrowly achieved. The
breadth of legislative abridgement must be viewed in the light of less dras-
tic means for achieving the same basic purpose.' 08
Accordingly, if there are feasible alternatives to vagrancy ordinances for
effectuating the goals of crime prevention and investigation, then broadly
written vagrancy laws which stifle the freedom of movement are unneces-
sary. Such alternatives do exist, such as the New York "Stop and Frisk"
Law,109 The Uniform Arrest Act (1941), The Model Code of Pre-Arraign-
ment Procedure (1968), and the Model Penal Code (1962). All of these
approaches are less restricting on liberty than the ordinary municipal va-
grancy ordinance because they forbid arrests on mere suspicion, do not
make it a crime to exercise the privilege against self-incrimination, and do
not shift the burden of proof to the accused.
Second, those cases which have upheld restrictions on freedom of travel
have done so because various emergency factors such as war, depression, or
natural catastrophe" necessitated such restrictions for the public good.
The asserted "compelling governmental interest" behind vagrancy laws is
crime prevention."' Theoretically, this purpose is as valid in restricting
movement as is war, depression, and natural catastrophe. However, in
105 381 U.S. 1 (1965).
16 For an excellent discussion and critique of the power of the federal government to impede
travel, see Rauh and Pollitt, Restrictions on the Right to Travel, 13 W. RES. L. REV. 128 (1961).
10 T Zemel v. Rusk, 381 U.S. 1 (1965).
108 Aptheker v. Secretary of State, 378 U.S. 500, 508 (1964).
109 N.Y. CODE CRIM. Plaoc § 180 (1971).
110 Zemel v. Rusk, 381 U.S. 1, 15-16 (1965).
111 District of Columbia v. Hunt, 163 F.2d 833 (D.C. Cir. 1947); United States v. Marge-
son, 259 F. Supp. 256 (E.D. Pa. 1966); Note, The Vagrancy Concept Reconsidered: Problems
and Abuses of Status Criminality, 37 N.Y.U.L. REV. 102 (1962).
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order for this purpose to be valid, these laws must be shown to be effective
devices in crime prevention. Yet numerous studies have revealed that
"crime control, has not been shown to have the slightest relation to the
class of persons whom the laws restrain... ."112
3. Freedom from Arrest and Conviction on Suspicion 1 3
The Supreme Court has interpreted the Constitution to require the gov-
ernment to meet certain burdens of proof according to the magnitude of
the deprivation of liberty to which they submit persons. For instance, a
brief, temporary intrusion on the liberty of a citizen by a police officer dur-
ing a "street encounter" requires the officer to "be able to point to specific
and articulable facts which, taken together with rational inferences from
those facts, reasonably warrant that intrusion." 1 4  As the deprivation of
liberty becomes more serious, the officer's justification for his actions must
be accordingly higher. Therefore when a mere "street encounter" leads to
an arrest, the officer must have "probable cause," based on "facts and cir-
cumstances within [his] knowledge and of which . . . [he) had reason-
able trustworthy information . . . sufficient to warrant a prudent man in
believing that the [accused] had committed or was committing an of-
fense."'1  And finally, if conviction is desired, the burden of proof must
extend "beyond a reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to constitute
the crime with which he is charged.""16
Historically, vagrancy laws have been employed as a method of cir-
cumventing these constitutional requirements.
The use of vagrancy arrests by the police to obtain custody of a man whom
they suspect of more serious offenses but whom they cannot lawfully arrest
for such offenses because there is not probable cause to support an arrest
is a matter of common observation .... 117
The inherent defect of suspicious person laws was most recently announced
by the Ohio Supreme Court in Columbus v. Thompson,1 8 in which the
court favorably cited the Massachusetts case of Alegata v. Common-
wealth.119
Suspicion, which is an inadequate ground for arrest, is no more satisfactory
112 Amsterdam, supra note 32, at 214; see, e.g., Foote, Vagrancy-Type Law and Its Admin-
istratioa, 104 U. PA. L REv. 603, 625-28 (1956); Lacey, Vagrancy and Other Crimes of Personal
Condition, 66 HARv. L REv. 1203, 1224-25 (1953).
113 For a more detailed analysis of this argument, see Amsterdam, supra note 32, at 227;
Douglas, supra note 46; Foote, supra note 112; Lacey, supra note 112.
114 Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21 (1968).
1"r Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89, 91 (1970).
11o In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970).
117 Amsterdam, supra note 32, at 226-27; see aso Jones v. Peyton, 411 F.2d 857 (4th Cir.
1969).
118 25 Ohio St. 2d 26,266 N.E.2d 571 (1971).
IID 353 Mfass. 287, 231 N.E.2d 201 (1967).
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as a basis for punishment. In holding invalid a statute authorizing arrest and
prosecution of a "suspicious person" the Court of Appeals for the District
of Columbia in a well considered opinion said, "Mere suspicion is no evi-
dence of crime of any particular kind, and it forms no element in the con-
stitution of crime. Suspicion may exist without even the knowledge of the
party who is the object of the suspicion, as to the matter of which he is
suspected. The suspicion may be generated in the mind of one or more
persons without even colorable foundation of truth for the suspicion.
Stoutenburgh v. Frazier, 16 App. D.C. 229, 234-235.120
/ 4. Privilege Against Self-Incrimination
The "satisfactory account" requirement of the suspicious person ordi-
nance in Palmer, the purpose of which is to shift the burden of proof onto
the defendant, may be an encroachment on the privilege against self-in-
crimination.' 2' The Court has held that this privilege exists where ques-
tions "are directed at a highly selective group inherently suspect of crimi-
nal activities ... where response... might involve ... the admission of a
crucial element of a crime.' 2  It takes little imagination to perceive that
persons arrested under suspicious person ordinances satisfy these require-
ments.
Even though dicta in both United States v. Miranda' and Escobedo
v. Illinois24 may imply that neither decision intended to limit the power of
the police to compel answers during street encounters (thus limiting the
privilege to courtroom proceedings), more recent opinions and commen-
taries explicitly state that the privilege does not contain this limitation.125
12025 Ohio St. 2d 26,32,266 N.E.2d 571,574 (1971).
121 However, the Court in Palmer did not so hold.
122 Albertson v. SACB, 382 U.S. 70, 79 (1965); see also Grosso v. United States, 390 U.S.
62 (1968); Marchetti v. United States, 390 U.S. 39 (1968).
123 384 U.S. 436, 477 (1966):
Our decision is not intended to hamper the traditional function of police officers
in investigating crime.... When an individual is in custody on probable cause, the
police may, of course, seek out evidence in the field to be used at trial against him.
Such investigation may include inquiry of persons not under restraint. General on-
the-scene questioning as to facts surrounding a crime or other general questioning of
citizens in the fact-finding process is not affected by our holding.
124 378 U.S. 478, 492 (1964):
Nothing we have said today affects the powers of the police to investigate an "un-
solved crime," ... by gathering information from witnesses and by other "proper in-
vestigative efforts."
15 Davis v. Mississippi, 394 U.S. 721, 727 n.6 (1969):
The State relies on various statements in our cases which approve general question-
ing of citizens in the course of investigating a crime.... But these statements merely
reiterated the settled principle that while the police have the right to request citizens
to answer voluntarily questions concerning unsolved crimes they have no right to com-
pel them to answer.
See also Note, Tacit Criminal Admissions in Light of the Expanding Privilege Against Self-
Incrimination, 52 CORNELL L.Q. 335, 338-40 (1967); LaFave, "Street Encounters" and the
-Constitutiop: Terry, Sibron, Peters, and Beyond, 67 MIC-. L REv. 40 (1968); Pilcher, The
Law and Practice of Field Interrogation, 58 J. CRIM. L.C. & P.S. 465 (1967).
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However, there have been other qualifications placed on the doctrine.
In Gardner v. Broderickua the Court conceded that
[alnswers may be compelled regardless of the privilege if there is immun-
ity from federal and state use of the compelled testimony or its fruits in
connection with a criminal prosecution against the person testifying. 27
An individual arrested under a suspicious person ordinance is obviously not
granted immunity from criminal prosecution, and in fact one of the pri-
mary purposes of such an arrest is to use the "fruits" of the defendant's
testimony to convict him of other and more serious crimes. That is, the
arrest may be an excuse to investigate the background of the accused to
determine whether he shows tendencies to commit future crimes or has com-
mitted past crimes.1 1 8
In order to demonstrate that a person arrested for vagrancy is definitely
in a "compelling" situation one need only look at the dilemma which faces
the accused: if he refuses to respond, he may be arrested for violation of
the ordinance; but if he does talk, he may incriminate himself because the
very nature of the policeman's questions call for incriminating answers.121
VI. CONCLUSION
The initial purpose of this note was to consider vagrancy laws in light
of the delicate balancing of the investigative powers of the police and the
personal liberties of the individual. However, based on the extensive ju-
dicial criticism of vagrancy laws, there appears to be no reason to effect
this balance. As they now stand, vagrancy ordinances are not only replete
with constitutional infirmities, but are also overwhelmingly ineffective in
attaining their asserted purpose of crime control. 30 A total rejection of va-
grancy legislation is the only logical solution. In order to preserve rea-
sonable investigative rights for law enforcement officials, vagrancy laws
could be replaced by conduct-criminality laws, subjecting an individual to
arrest only where the police have probable cause to believe that he has
committed a specific crime.1 31
There are excellent models which the city governments could adopt to
replace present vagrancy ordinances. For example, § 2 of the Uniform Ar-
rest Act strikes a delicate balance between the powers of the police to in-
vestigate and the personal rights of the individual. It allows the police to
detain suspicious persons. However, their suspicions must be based on a
126 392 U.S. 273 (1968).
127 Id. at 276 (emphasis added).
128 Foote, supra note 112; Lacey, supra note 112.
12D Schwartz, Stop and Frisk, 58 J. CRIM. L.C. & P.S. 433 (1967); Note, Constitutional At-
tacks on Vagrancy Laws, 20 STAN. L. REV. 782, 789-790 (1968).
130 See note 123 supra.
131 Sherry, supra note 72.
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reasonable belief that the suspect has, is, or is about to be engaged in crimi-
nal activity. Mere suspicion is not sufficient to justify the police encounter.
The Act also permits a policeman to question those individuals whom he
stops and to detain those who refuse to identify themselves; however, the
detention period may not exceed two hours and the detention may not be
recorded as an arrest. "The two hour limitation prevents temporary de-
tention from being transferred into imprisonment ex communicado with-
out the safeguards of arrest and its consequent responsibilities."' 132 Stig-
matization and the deleterious effects of an arrest and record are also pre-
vented by the Act.
Obviously, the first and foremost step in effectuating a revocation of
present vagrancy laws must be made by the legislatures and city councils.
It is unreasonable to place the burden on the courts, for this would result
in extreme delays and relative lack of uniform application. Additionally,
because the length of sentence and amount of the fine for violation of va-
grancy laws is so paltry,' and because those arrested are almost exclusive-
ly the poor and uneducated, 34 the incentive for change would be minimal
if left to the courts. The lawmakers must take the initiative if a change
is to occur.
William A. Kurtz
132Warner, The Uniform Arrest Act, 28 VA. L. REV. 315 (1942).
13 3 For instance, the penalty for violation of the ordinances in both Palmer and Coates was a
$50.00 fine and 30 days in jail.
-134See note 77 supra.
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